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Abstract  
 The law, in general, and more specifically the criminal law is guided 
by some basic principles. One of the principles, which is most important, is 
the principle of legality which represents the criminal discipline regarding the 
abolition of the retrospective power of the unfavorable norm. This can also be 
considered as the bad retrospective power. This paper focuses on analyzing 
this principle in the doctrinal aspect. The analysis focuses on how the principle 
of legality is enforced and interpreted on International Law and Albanian 
Criminal Law. This paper also aims to analyze different decisions of the 
European Court of Justice and Constitutional Court of Albania to find out the 
effect of this principle. 
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GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
The principle of legality generally acts as a “conditional principle for 
the executive body in the execution of its functions”, which can also be applied 
in the criminal law. This principle is a doctrinal-based principle, which 
nowadays is placed in the sections of the modern and democratic judicial 
order. This is based on the State of Law and it manages to fix every State’s 
action. This can act as a “criminal power” (potestapenale), its autonomous 
power, or as the State’s Sovereign interpretation (Ramacci, 1991). In the field 
of the Criminal Law, the principle of legality has been accepted and expressed 
as a judicial norm, which is applicable before the action is taken; so it must be 
in force the moment a person commits a specific action (Carlassare, 1990).  
The principle of legality in criminal law now constitutes an inevitable 
principle in our judicial culture, which can be defined as an absolute and 
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undeniable element in the determination of criminal offenses, in the 
expression of the principle of taxation, non-admission of retrospective power, 
its clarity in describing the typical fact entered into force before performing 
the action, not allowing the analogy, etc. In a modern and guaranteed system 
of criminal law, the principle of legality is undoubtedly placed in an apical 
position in relation to all principles and other legal values which are already 
part of the constitutional provisions. This principle is mostly theoretical and 
political rather than criminal. Its review is expressed in the doctrine of the 
“social contract” alongside the review provided by the “Magna Carta 
Libertatum” (Fiandaca & Musco, 2001). 
Furthermore, some authors affirm this principle through the 
interpretation of the “Magna Carta Libertatum” established in 1215 which 
has more procedural rather than substantive guarantees (Islami, Hoxha, & 
Panda, 2011). In the meantime, its evolution and development were made 
possible by the XVIII-XVIII century enlightened lawyer-philosophers, who 
evidenced the existence of fundamental rights and freedoms for individuals 
and their separation from State’s power. The latter had to necessarily exercise 
its function in the respect of the rights and freedoms in maintaining a 
proportional relationship (the principle of proportionality) between the 
undertaken measure and its purpose. 
Despite this, the followers that elaborated the principle of legality 
place the existence of the judge that is detached from the executive power at 
the very top. This is because, according to them, this kind of judge acts only 
according to the laws and elaborate the idea that the protection of the human 
rights can be achieved through the abolition of the retrospective power in the 
judicial norms. This is in respect to the principle of legal certainty based on 
the formula x (action), y (consequence) in which the act is punishable if it was 
illegal at the time it was committed (Montavani, 1992). The purpose of such a 
principle is to prohibit the arbitrary penalties for acts committed before the act 
was foreseen by the law. Thus, such elements have found formal recognition 
in addition to the constitutions of different countries, even in the “Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Citizens" of 1789, where the guarantee 
function comes from "predictability of the fact by law before the time of 
action”. Judicially speaking, the principle of legality is a manifestation of the 
famous roman expression “nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege” which was 
later elaborated by the famous German criminal lawyer, Anslem Feuerbach. 
He emphasized that if we want to denounce someone criminally, it is important 
for that person to have some knowledge about the law in order for him to know 
the kind of offences that are punishable, and executing such offences could 
bring some negative judicial effects (Fiandaca & Musco, 2001).  
It is worth mentioning that the principle of legality is not only the 
manifestation of the obligation of the State power (its first meaning) to respect 
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the rights of the citizens in exercising their rights, and to punish acts provided 
that they are foreseen as criminal facts, but it goes even further to play a 
preventive role. This is viewed in the spirit of elaboration made by Feuerbach 
who stated that the citizen should be known with the incriminating norm, 
which results in a preventive role fearful from punishment (Grasso, 1972). 
With such an elaboration, the principle of legality (or of the legal backup) finds 
an excuse in scientific terms of nature within the criminal system, and it is 
fully in line with the elaboration of the principle by the liberalist Democrats 
and the one made by Feuerbach. It is worth mentioning that with this formula, 
we can have a reference in “having the monopoly of the legislature in the 
selection of punishable facts and the sanctions to be applied” (Giovagnoli, 
2008).  However, this monopoly shall not be considered as an unconditional 
power, but instead it must be considered as a power that is conditioned by the 
obligation of the legislature in determining the facts and the respective 
penalties. Its obligation in decriminalizing or abolishing criminal offences, 
procedurally speaking, cannot be scientifically proven. This is also the case of 
its obligation to determine the preventability of the application of the “malam 
partem” analogy. In the modern criminal law, in respect to the principle of 
legality or to the legal reserve, the analogy is prohibited to be applied when 
the position of the defendant is deteriorating which is also known as “malam 
partem”. This is a rule, and as such there is an exception, in the sense that it 
is permissible to apply analogy in cases when its application is favored by the 
defendant. This is otherwise known as the application of analogy to “in bonam 
partem”. 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE’S 
PRACTICE  
The principle of legality in criminal law is brought by the Court of 
Justice, based on the constitutional provisions of the European countries and 
Article 7.1 of the ECHR. However, it should be said that decision-making, 
based on the constitutional provisions of EU countries, has served more in 
practical ways in solving issues that have been brought for consideration. 
Beyond that, the practical effects has played a decisive role in the Article 7.1 
of the ECHR and the broad and consolidated practice of the ECHR. 
However, this context brings to light a decision of the Court of Justice 
which stresses that the "principle of legality" is an element of the principle of 
the clarity of the norm: it also requires that the legal rules of the European 
Community countries should be clear and precise, except it is a constitutional 
principle of EU countries. It is also a principle described in the Article 7.1 of 
ECHR (The case T-279/02). 
In some cases, the Court of Justice does not accept this principle. This 
is based on the demands put forward by the legitimate parties, affirming the 
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view that the principle of allowing favorable retrospective power is an internal 
matter that is observed by judges (Armone, 2010). Therefore, the Alain case 
(The case C-341/94), states that if an initial conduct contrary to the European 
Community rules, and consequently to domestic law, it may be recalculated 
based on the function of the criminal law by a judge in cases when the 
circumstances of fact or the law have been changed. “In this case, retraining 
should not be understood as making a new legal status but withdrawing the 
charge or dismissing the case for lack of fact.” 
In adddition, Mr. Alain had declared that during the year 1985 to 
1986, he imported goods from the Yugoslav Republic to France, when in fact 
these goods were imported from the Democratic Republic of Germany. At that 
time, it was not part of the rules regarding the free movement of the goods 
with the aim of avoiding taxes. The French authorities started a criminal 
proceeding against Mr. Alain, accusing him for the criminal offence of not 
“declaring the prohibited goods”. During the proceeding in 1990, the rules 
regarding the free movement of the goods were applied even in the German 
Democratic Republic. This was as a result of its union with the German 
Federal Republic (the fall of the Berlin Wall). In this decision, the Court does 
not deny the fact that Mr. Alain has committed a criminal offence because of 
his false testimony, but if he had done this after the union of the two parts of 
Germany, his act would not be considered as a criminal offence at all. Bearing 
these things in mind, the Court of Justice forces the local Court (the Court of 
the inner system) to apply favorable rates (mitigation measures).  
Also, in the case of Saeti and Frediani, the court of justice held that it 
was not competent to apply domestic law in order to bring the effects of the 
changes in favored domestic norms that determine the decriminalization of the 
criminal offense (Hoxha, 2013). The case that is being discussed concerned 
the two persons quoted above, who had executive positions at an oil refinery.  
They are accused of the criminal offense of using “Coke di Petrolio” “Carbon 
mass that is taken as a sub product of a certain refining process and is used 
for gas extraction” (Enciclopedia della Scienza e della Tecnica, 2008). This 
action at that time in the Italian State was a criminal offense, because its use 
was prohibited by EU directive 75/442. After the proceedings have been 
initiated, this Directive changes. This does not stop the application of this 
process but permits it. On the request of the legitimate subject, it was argued 
that the person in question could no longer proceed on this fact. This is 
because, given the changes made to the directive, this act did not constitute a 
criminal offense. However, the Court held that it was not within its 
competence to express on this fact, since the interpretation of international law 
is the competence of the courts of the ordinary system (The case C-235/02). 
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THE TOMBESI ISSUE REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY  
The Tombesi issue is the object of interpreting the notion of rejection 
in relation to the European Union Directive 75/442. From a chronological 
point of view, the first issue under consideration comes from the pre-trial 
proceedings made by the Tern and the Court (The procedure C-304/94 & the 
procedure C-342/94). In this case, the defendants were charged with the 
criminal offense of "transportation, unloading, and storage of unauthorized 
waste". The defendants alleged that they could not be prosecuted for the 
criminal offense because the case which, according to the directive, was 
forbidden to be transported was made lawful under domestic law. Thus, the 
defendants sought the application of the retrospective power of the favored 
criminal law because their action was no longer a penile act. 
Furthermore, faced with such a fact where the domestic legislation 
after the amendments permitted the transportation of this case and 
international law specifically to the said directive, which prohibits it, the court 
suspends the case and addresses the court of justice for interpretation of that 
fact. This is in the sense that when internal law changes, as a result, a given 
fact no longer constitutes a criminal offense. Thus, when such a change 
contradicts international law, can the principle of allowing retrospective 
power be applied when favoring the defendant? 
Regarding this issue, the Court of Justice in its decision argues that "even if 
we are faced with a violation of international norms through the changes that 
are under the laws, the right of EU countries in cases where the defendant is 
not favored, cannot apply the latter by his burdened position in the process. 
This is because it relates to the principle of the legality of the sentence, where 
an individual may be convicted of an act if the fact constitutes a criminal 
offense under the provisions of the law of the country. The second argument 
put forward by the Court of Justice is that directives cannot be applied directly 
where domestic law is inconsistent with them, and when it (the directive) 
imposes criminal liability or aggravates it at a time when domestic law does 
not foresee it as a criminal offense. This, however, is because directives cannot 
produce effects for specific subjects or predefined names (Sentence of the case 
C-343/98). 
Also, in support of the foregoing arguments, the Court of Justice in 
another case, known as the Niselli case, accepts the claims of the lawyer as to 
the non-direct application of the directive when it affects the position of a 
person accused of committing a criminal offense. This (lawyer) emphasized 
that: "The direct application of the directive has no effect in cases when it 
defines criminal responsibility when domestic law no longer provides for such 
as at the time of action, because internal law is autonomous from the 
directives. This means that "it is sufficient to repeal a rule that once brings 
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criminal responsibility to an individual at a time when the directives envisage 
such a criminal act. Also, the basis of criminal liability shall be domestic law 
and not internationally. However, in cases where domestic law provides for 
an act as a criminal act but an international act does not tally, the directive 
will make direct application. What is noteworthy is the fact that the court does 
not comment on the argument made by the lawyer that "the directive has direct 
application in cases where the defendant favors". 
 
AFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN THE 
BERLUSCONI CASE (Cause Riunite C-387/02) 
 In the Tombesi and Niselli case, we saw how the European Court of 
Justice argues that the norms of Community law do not have a direct impact 
on the criminal liability of a subject as long as its action at the time of trial in 
the domestic legal system does not constitute a criminal offense of the 
community right. However, what is the legal situation in the Berlusconi case? 
In the present case, Mr. Berlusconi was prosecuted for criminal offenses in the 
field of commercial companies, specifically "The criminal offense of falsifying 
balances". At the time of his trial, he intervenes in the Italian criminal code, 
not considering this as a criminal offense, and therefore it is seen as 
unpunishable. Under such conditions, Milan's judges suspend the process and 
send the case for interpretation of domestic law in relation to European 
community norms regarding their compliance with the European Court of 
Justice. The dissatisfaction of the Italian judges is concerned with the 
compatibility of the new standards with the directives on companies' law 
imposing on Member States the provision of effective, proportionate, and 
dissuasive penalties for false accounting works (Directives I, IV and VII in 
about the companies). 
Under these conditions, the Milan Judges argued that in this principle, 
there is a discrepancy in the domestic legislation "Criminal Code with respect 
to the criminal offense quoted above" with the acts of the European Union, 
namely directives in the field of commercial companies. This is with the 
reaffirmation that at the time the Italian lawmaker were decriminalizing the 
criminal offense of counterfeiting of balances, there existed an obligation 
arising from the EU directives where States should provide effective and 
punitive punishments for criminal offenses of false accounting, by making a 
repeal in violation of these acts. In the present case, Mr. Berlusconi's lawyer 
presented to the Luxembourg Court the arguments which he had put forward 
in the proceedings against Niselli and Tombesi. He however did this in more 
detail by making part of the reasoning as the decision of the court on those two 
subjects in which arguing the lack of power of community law is seen in cases 
when it brings direct criminal responsibility to certain individuals (Defense 
Counsel Kokott who also defended Niselli and Tombesi).  
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In the present case, the Luxembourg Court abruptly maintains a 
different attitude from that held in the Tombesi and Niselli case where the case 
is identical in the element such as: the facts of the offense at the time when 
they were punished under national law; there is a change of the case favorably 
for the accused, which is in accordance with the previous legislative 
continuity; where his action at the time of the trial was no more criminal 
offense. Meanwhile, this is with regard to the acts, not the fact, specifically, of 
the relationship with the community law. In this case, the contrast between the 
internal standard overrides a directive and no direct effect was reported. This 
was precisely the fact that lawyer Kokotti presented the same conclusions and 
excuses as in the Tombesi and Niselli case. In its decision, the Luxembourg 
Court argues: "where there is a link between domestic acts and acts of the 
European Community, the retroactive application of the preferential criminal 
law is justified only if the priority of Community law is guaranteed; this is so 
that the objectives of the legislature community and the national legislature 
(revised) is in compliance with the requirements of Community law. If not, the 
national judges should ensure the application of the provisions of Community 
law, leaving aside national provisions even if it concerns more favorable 
criminal laws. This position of the Luxembourg court is undoubtedly a legal 
remedy contrary to the very nature of the directives which have no binding 
effect on the States parties but have advisory recommendations. Also, from 
the point of view of the conclusions, this court argument contradicts its own 
practice which was also apparent in the Tombesi and Niselli case that 
international acts do not have direct effects on certain individuals. Thus, these 
effects subsequently bring criminal responsibility to these individuals. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights on the Principle of "Favor 
Rei" (Article 7/1) 
In addition to the codification of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms at the world level (made through the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and through the Charter of Civil and Political Rights), which 
are the main notions of Favor Rei, there is also a legal protection of these rights 
at European level, through the "European Convention on Human Rights". The 
main role of such a legal protection is the "Council of Europe", which in 1950 
made it possible to establish the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention signed in Rome on 4 November 1950). The European Court of 
Human Rights through the diversification of decisions, deep analysis, and the 
disclosure of substantive arguments has consolidated not only its court 
practice but also its domestic legal systems. 
This Convention makes it possible to establish a postulate that 
"fundamental rights and freedoms cannot be protected only by an internal 
legal system". This is because in most cases, it is precisely the domestic legal 
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system through the force of state authority that violates human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In this context, it was considered reasonable to create 
an international instrument that would make it possible to guarantee by 
restoring in place the rights violated or alleged to have been violated in an 
internal court case where it is precisely the case of the "European Court for 
Human Rights ", otherwise known as the "Strasbourg Court ". This court acts 
as a guarantor of human rights at the European level, which through its activity 
offers a panorama or provoke a uniform application of the legal norms of this 
convention, certainly based on the specifics of each case. 
 
LACK OF THE FAVOR OF REI (ABOLITO CRIMINIS) IN THE 
ECHR 
As is also apparent from the preamble to Article 7 of the Convention, 
there is a non-existent projection of the application of the criminal law even 
for offenses committed contrary to the criminal law changes when the 
defendant is favored by the changes made. The ECHR in its case-law has 
forbidden the application of Article 7 of the ECHR, when the criminal law 
favors the defendant (full abrogation). Also, this court in general sanctions the 
principle of legality "that an act is punishable when it is foreseen before it is 
committed and that the law foresees a sanction, imposing the prohibition of 
so-called analogue" in malam partem " and that a crime should be clearly and 
precisely defined in the law (Kokkinakis C.V. Greece, 1993). 
Article 7 of the Convention is disciplined by the phenomenon of 
"Criminal Law Action in Time", otherwise known as the principle of legality 
configured with the term "No Penalty without a Law". This provision prohibits 
the application of the criminal law for acts which at the time of their 
commission did not constitute a criminal offense under domestic or 
international law, but by elaborating the fact that it is permissible to apply the 
criminal law in time for criminal offenses committed before the changes that 
the law has undergone when the latter favors its author (Salihi, 2016;  Muçi, 
2010). The principle of favor is not explicitly stated by the ECHR, but the 
bodies authorized by the Convention have enabled the affirmation of a 
favorable rate based on concrete cases, thus setting general standards for 
subsequent cases. 
Regarding international acts, the constitutional lawmaker has made a 
trivial guarantor for international acts, defining what their strength is, how the 
reports of domestic acts are, and how their incorporation is. Thus, referring to 
Article 5 of the Constitution, Articles 116 and 122, the above trinomial is 
highlighted (Albanian Constitution, Article 122). Article 5 of our constitution 
identifies the value of international acts and the effects of adopting an 
international act by making it part of the domestic legal system. This states 
that international acts are mandatory for implementation by Albanian 
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institutions as well as the side of the Courts that make up the justice system in 
the Republic of Albania. Their compulsory nature is closely related and 
reflected by the introduction of legal norms made by Article 116 of the 
Constitution, which in the view of the contradiction of domestic and 
international norms gives priority to international acts for implementation 
(Albanian Constitution). 
In the interpretation of these constitutional provisions, the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania is also pronounced, which in 
its decisions indicates the nature of international acts. In its ruling, this Court 
states: "As stated in some of its decisions, the European Court of Human 
Rights, the guarantee embodied in Article 7 of the Convention, is an essential 
element of the rule of law. This guarantee must be interpreted and applied in 
such a way as to provide effective safeguards against prosecution, guilty plea, 
and arbitrary punishment" (Decision no. 14, 17.04.2007). 
Furthermore, in its reasoning, this Court states: "According to Article 
29/3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, the favorable criminal law 
has retroactive effect”. This important constitutional principle is explicitly 
mentioned in Article 15/1 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, ratified by the Republic of Albania on 04.01.1992. 
In another decision which highlights the relationship between 
international and domestic acts, not limited to the notion of favor, the 
Constitutional Court states: "In conclusion, following the foregoing reasoning, 
the Court considers that in the process developed by the courts of ordinary 
jurisdiction, the right to a due legal process has been violated in the sense of 
Article 42 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR.” 
 The Albanian Constitutional Court, by its Decision 6/2006, states: 
"According to Article 116 of the Constitution, the Convention as an 
international agreement ratified by law in the hierarchy of legal norms ranks 
immediately after the Constitution. Consequently, it occupies an important 
place in domestic law and becomes enforceable for each state, for all state 
bodies including here and the courts of each level as well as the bodies that 
enforce their decisions. The guarantees of the Convention affect the 
interpretation and protection of the individual's fundamental rights and 
freedoms expressed by the Constitution of the Republic of Albania. In addition, 
the Constitutional Court notes that the text of the Convention and the case law 
of the Strasbourg Court serve to make constitutional interpretation and to 
determine, on a case-by-case basis, the boundaries of fundamental 
constitutional rights. This position of the Convention comes as a result of the 
commitment of the Albanian State to provide a guaranteed protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Another important aspect relates to 
the obligations deriving from the case law of the Strasbourg Court for the 
parties to the proceedings because, under Article 41 of the Convention, the 
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Contracting Parties, by ratification of the Convention, are obliged to ensure 
the compatibility of the legislation internal to the Convention. In addition, the 
practice of this Court places importance on the guiding values of its 
jurisprudence for the Albanian courts as well.” (Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Albania No. 6/2006) 
 
Conclusion 
Thus, as noted above, the analysis of International Act such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the practice of the European Court 
of Justice, the domestic law such as the Constitution of the Albanian Republic, 
and the practice of the Constitution Court of Albania determine that the 
principle of the Legality has an important place for the well-functioning of the 
justice system, particularly, by the Courts. 
Also, the analysis of this principle determine that it is not only an 
inevitable principle in criminal law but as well as a guaranty and an absolute 
undeniable element in the determination of criminal offenses. 
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